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Objective: Cerebellar neurodegenerative disorders (CDs) are a heterogeneous group
of disorders. It is known that the cerebellum plays a role not only in motor, but also in
cognitive and social cognitive functions. The aim of this study was to investigate social
cognition in patients with different CDs.
Materials and Methods: Social cognition was examined in 34 patients, 12 with
spinocerebellar ataxia type 1 (SCA1), 6 with spinocerebellar ataxia type 2 (SCA2), and 16
with idiopathic late onset cerebellar ataxia (ILOCA). All patients were clinically evaluated
using the Scale for the Rating and Assessment of Ataxia. In addition, 34 age, sex,
and education-matched healthy control (HC) subjects were similarly analyzed. Social
cognition was studied using two tests: the Faux Pas Recognition Test and the Reading
the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET). An appropriate array of neuropsychological tests was
used to assess the global cognitive status as well as the frontal functions and mood.
Results: CD patients achieved significantly worse results on both tests of social
cognition compared to the HCs. The SCA1 + 2 group achieved the poorest results on
the Faux Pas Recognition Test and exhibited poor performance on all cognitive tests,
but was only significantly worse compared to the ILOCA group on the Free and Cued
Selective Reminding Test (FCSRT) – recognition. The patients in the SCA1 + 2 and
ILOCA groups obtained similar scores on RMET. In the SCA1 + 2 group the findings
significantly correlated with clinical parameters of disease severity and duration and
executive functions (EFs), and with mood and executive functions in the ILOCA group. In
the SCA group EFs appeared as the only significant predictor of RMET achievement. The
Boston Naming Test (BTN) was a significant predictor of the CD patients’ achievement
on RMET, while the BTN, the Trail Making Test Part A and FCSRT – Delayed free recall
predicted their performance on the Faux Pas Recognition Test.
Conclusion: Patients with CD have social cognitive impairments as demonstrated by
the Faux Pas Test and the RMET test results. The SCA1 and 2 patients exhibited a more
pronounced impairment compared with the ILOCA patients. The independent cognitive
predictors of social cognition impairment were EFs and language.
Keywords: cerebellum, neurodegenerative disorder, spinocerebellar ataxia, idiopathic late-onset cerebellar
ataxia, theory of mind, social cognition
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INTRODUCTION
Cerebellar neurodegenerative disorders (CD) encompass a group
of diverse disorders affecting the cerebellum and its pathways.
Some of these disorders, such as autosomal dominant cerebellar
ataxias or spinocerebellar ataxias (SCAs) are characterized by
cerebellar signs, as well as additional non-cerebellar signs,
including extrapyramidal features, pyramidal signs, peripheral
neuropathy, and in some types of SCA, cognitive deficits
(Shakkottai and Fogel, 2013; Sullivan et al., 2019). SCA1 and
SCA2, the two types of cerebellar ataxias which are caused by
trinucleotide expansion, represent the most common types in
the Serbian population (Dragasević et al., 2006). Another group
of ataxias is idiopathic late-onset cerebellar ataxias (ILOCA)
or sporadic adult-onset ataxias, whose etiology still remains
unknown. These disorders are non-hereditary and degenerative
ataxias characterized by a slowly progressive cerebellar syndrome
(Barbosa et al., 2016; Klockgether, 2018).
It is a well-known and widely reported fact that the cerebellum
plays a vital role in motor functions (Glickstein, 1992; Manto
et al., 2012). It is equally well-known that this role also
extends to cognitive and behavioral functioning (Schmahmann,
1991, 1996; Middleton and Strick, 1994; Schmahmann and
Sherman, 1997; Riva and Giorgi, 2000; Ravizza et al., 2006;
Frings et al., 2007; Baillieux et al., 2008; Stoodley and
Schmahmann, 2009; Thompson and Steinmetz, 2009; Stoodley,
2012; Koziol et al., 2014; Hoche et al., 2018). However,
scientists still disagree as to the exact role of the cerebellum in
cognition (Cooper et al., 2010). Some sources have suggested
that different cognitive functions are localized to specific
regions of the cerebellum (Cooper et al., 2010). Patients with
cerebellar disturbances have significant and relevant deficits
in the working memory, visuospatial, language, and executive
function (EF) domains (Ahmadian et al., 2019; Silveri, 2020).
Patients with different types of hereditary ataxias, especially
SCA1 and SCA2, show impairments in EF, verbal memory,
and attention (Bürk et al., 2001; Le Pira et al., 2002), while
ILOCA patients show impairments in visuospatial function,
verbal fluency, and mental flexibility (Rentiya et al., 2018). In
addition, patients with degenerative ataxias exhibit changes in
emotions (Adamaszek et al., 2017) and social cognition (SC)
(Sokolovsky et al., 2010).
The ability to estimate mental states of other people is a
fundamental aspect of social cognition (Van Overwalle et al.,
2014). Social cognition primarily implies a basic, automatic level
of recognizing and attributing emotions to others by immediate
perception, which can be assessed by Reading the Mind in the
Eyes Test (RMET) (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Serafin and Surian,
2004; Clausi et al., 2018). In addition to this, the theory of mind
(ToM) is considered as a higher level of social interference,
defined as the ability to attribute mental states to others and
adopting the perspectives of other persons to understand and
predict behavior (Premack and Woodruff, 1978; Van Overwalle
et al., 2014). According to Baron Cohen, having “theory of
mind” means being able to infer a full range of mental states
(beliefs, desires, intentions, imagination, emotions), or the ability
to reflect on the content of one’s own and others’ minds
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1999). One of the tools commonly used to
assess ToM is the Faux-Pas Recognition Test (Stone et al., 1998;
Liverta Sempio et al., 2005; Clausi et al., 2018).
The cerebellum is incorporated in associative and paralimbic
circuits which are involved in social cognition (Van Overwalle
et al., 2014; Heleven and Van Overwalle, 2018). Our knowledge
of how exactly the neuronal circuitry supports complex human
behaviors remains insufficient; however, it is known that it
includes fronto-limbic connections, the medial precuneus and
medial prefrontal cortex, temporoparietal junction, superior
temporal sulcus (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Aichhorn et al.,
2009; Van Overwalle and Vandekerckhove, 2013), orbitofrontal
regions, dorsal and lateral prefrontal cortex (Abu-Akel and
Shamay-Tsoory, 2011), the amygdala (Adolphs, 2004), and the
insula (Kipps et al., 2007). Other important participants in social
cognition are mirror neurons in the ventral premotor and rostral
posterior parietal cortices (Rizzolatti et al., 2006) and middle
temporal gyrus (Johnstone et al., 2006).
The cerebellum and its connections have recently been added
to the neural network of social cognition. It has previously been
shown that not only the patients with complex cerebello-cerebral
degeneration, but also those with isolated cerebellar lesions, have
specific impairments in social cognition abilities (Abel et al., 2007;
Sokolovsky et al., 2010; D’Agata et al., 2011; Hoche et al., 2016).
Moreover, imaging studied have shown evidence of cerebellar
activation during ToM tasks (Brunet et al., 2000; Calarge et al.,
2003; Stoodley, 2012; Van Overwalle et al., 2014; Clausi et al.,
2018; Guell et al., 2018).
The aim of this study was to assess social cognition in patients
with different hereditary and non-hereditary degenerative ataxias
using social cognition tests. Our hypotheses were the following:
(1) Patients with hereditary and non-hereditary cerebellar
disorders would exhibit impairments on the Faux Pas Recognition
Test and RMET compared with healthy controls. (2) Patients with
SCA1 and SCA2 would exhibit a more pronounced impairment
on the Faux Pas Recognition Test and RMET compared with
ILOCA patients. (3) Patients with SCA1/SCA2 would exhibit
different neuropsychological profiles to those with ILOCA. (4)
Executive dysfunctions would be correlated with social cognition
in both groups. (5) Executive dysfunctions would be a significant
predictor of social cognition in both groups of patients.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Social cognition was studied in 34 patients [mean age/SD:
48.9/11.8 (years); mean education/SD: 12.7/2.1 (years); M/F:
20/14]: 18 with spinocerebellar ataxias (12 SCA1 and 6 SCA2
patients) and 16 ILOCA patients. All patients presented with
diffuse cerebellar atrophy on MRI, while SCA1 and SCA2
patients further exhibited brainstem atrophy and generalized
cortical atrophy, and genetic disorders were confirmed by genetic
analyses. SCA1 and SCA2 patients carried a heterozygous CAG
triplet expansion with 53.5 ± 5.2 repeats (range 48 to 63) in
the coding ATXN1 region and CAG triplet expansion with
37.6 ± 1.5 repeats (range 36 to 40) in the coding ATXN2
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region, respectively. The subjects were diagnosed and tested at the
Neurology Clinic of the Clinical Center of Serbia (CCS) in 2017–
2020. The patients were taking dietary supplements (vitamin E
and selenium, Coenzyme Q10). None of the patients showed any
major psychiatric disorders, anxiety or depressive traits, nor were
they taking antidepressants or any other psychoactive drugs. In
addition to the previously described body of patients with ataxias,
34 age, sex, and education-matched healthy control (HC) subjects
were enrolled in the study. An appropriate battery of tests was
used to assess global cognitive status, frontal neuropsychological
functions, social cognition, and mood. All participants were
informed of the purpose, procedures, and scope of all the
examination and were included in the screening only after
providing their written informed consent for participation.
Clinical Assessment
The patients were clinically evaluated using SARA (Scale for
the Rating and Assessment of Ataxia), which assesses a range
of different impairments in cerebellar ataxia (Schmitz-Hübsch
et al., 2006). This Scale assesses the following aspects: truncal
ataxia, speech disturbance and limb ataxia. It has eight categories
with an accumulative score ranging from 0 (no ataxia) to 40
(most severe ataxia).
Social Cognition
Faux Pas Recognition Test
A social faux pas occurs when a speaker says something without
considering that the listener might not want to hear it or might
be hurt by what has been said, implying a false or mistaken belief
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1999). In normal circumstances, people are
usually able to recognize the faux pas and understand that the
person who said something inappropriate did not know that that
the listener would be upset by the faux pas. To understand faux
pas the subject must identify wrong behavior in the context of
predicted social interactions. The events that constitute a faux
pas are unpredicted, and the subject needs to compare events
and social expectations constantly while in no-faux pas stories the
events are expected and require a low level of prediction.
We used a Serbian adaptation of the revised version of the
faux pas stories (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Ðord̄ević, 2013) to
evaluate the ability to recognize a social faux pas. The detection
of a faux pas requires both a cognitive understanding of false
or mistaken beliefs and an appreciation of the emotional impact
of a statement on the listener. Twenty stories were read to the
participants, who were provided with copies of the stories to read
along as the stories were read and check back over their contents.
Ten of the stories involved a social faux pas (Faux Pas stories),
and 10 were control stories in which no faux pas occurred (No-
Faux Pas stories). After listening to each story, the subject was
asked whether anyone had said anything they should not have
said. When a faux pas was identified, specific clarifying questions
were asked to verify the participant’s understanding of the mental
and emotional state of the agent involved in the stories. Samples
of Faux Pas and No-Faux Pas stories with respective questions
are reported. Separate reports were made for the: (a) faux pas-
related questions about the stories containing a faux pas, (b)
control questions on the faux pas stories, (c) faux-pas-related
questions on the control stories, and (d) control questions on
the control stories. Separate reporting helped keep track of the
type of errors the participants had made i.e., whether they had
more faux-pas-related errors (ToM errors) or errors on the
factual control questions. If a control question was answered
incorrectly, other errors made in connection with that particular
story were interpreted with caution. Each correctly answered
question related to a Faux Pas story was scored as 1, yielding a
maximum score of 6 for each correctly identified Faux Pas story
and altogether 60 for the total of 10 Faux Pas stories. For each
No-Faux Pas story a score of 2 was given if the subject correctly
identified the absence of a faux pas. Two questions assessing the
comprehension of the story material were asked after each story.
The results were converted into percentages.
Emotion Recognition Test
To examine the participants’ ability to infer the mental states of
others, we used a Serbian adaptation of the revised version of
the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET) (Baron-Cohen
et al., 2001; Ðord̄ević et al., 2017). The test evaluates the first
stage (automatic) mentalizing and consists of 36 photographs of
the actors’ eye region, each printed on a separate sheet of paper.
Four adjectives corresponding to complex internal mental state
descriptors were given.
The participants were required to identify the sex of the people
in the pictures. They were also asked to decide which of the four
words best described what the individuals in the photographs
were thinking or feeling. Only one of the four words (the target
word) correctly described the mental state of the person in the
photograph. Although more than one word might have seemed
applicable, the participants were instructed to choose only one,
making sure to carefully read all four before making a decision.
The answers were not timed. However, the participants were
asked to complete the task as quickly as possible. The use of a
dictionary was allowed in case of an unfamiliar word. For each
correct answer, the participants received 1 point. The maximum
number of points was 36. The test results were then divided by the
maximum number of points (36) and converted into percentages.
Neuropsychological Screening
Cognitive functions were assessed using selected tests from a
neuropsychological battery that included the following:
Global cognitive functioning was measured with the
Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination –
Revised (ACE-R) (Mioshi et al., 2006). The test consists
of 5 subscales designed to assess attention and orientation,
fluency, language, visuospatial skills, and verbal memory. For
the assessment of global functioning we used the total score.
To test this aspect we also used the standard Mini-Mental State
Examination (MMSE) (Folstein et al., 1975).
Learning and episodic verbal memory were assessed with the
Free and Cued Selective Reminding Test (FCSRT) (Buschke, 1984;
Grober et al., 1988) using the immediate total free recall (total
number of items retrieved over 3 learning trials), delayed free
recall (number of words freely recalled after a 30-min delay),
and recognition (number of recognized words after delayed free
and cued recall).
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TABLE 1 | Socio-demographic characteristics of groups, clinical characteristics and mood scales – descriptive statistics.
SCA1 + 2 (n = 18, 10M + 8F) ILOCA (n = 16, 10M + 6F) HC (n = 34, 16M + 18F)
Mean/Median (sd) Range Mean/Median (sd) Range Mean/Median (sd) Range
Age (yrs) 43.78/42.5 (12.4) 22–68 54.8/55.5 (7.9) 38–68 49.1/44 (11.8) 22–68
Education (yrs) 12.2/12 (2.3) 8–16 13.1/12 (1.7) 11–16 12.7/12 (2.1) 8–16
Onset of disease (yrs) 32.7/30.5 (10.6) 16–53 47.6/48.5 (8.9) 28–62 – –
Disease duration (yrs) 10.9/8.5 (9.1) 2–38 7.1/7.5 (4.2) 2–15 – –
Truncal ataxia 7.4/7 (2.1) 4–12 4.4/4 (1.9) 2–8 – –
Dysarthria 2.5/3 (0.6) 1–3 1.7/1.5 (1.1) 0–4 – –
Limb ataxia 5.3/5 (2.2) 3–12 2.9/2.5 (1.6) 0–6 – –
SARA1 15.3/15 (3.8) 10–22 9.0/8.5 (3.7) 3–18 – –
HDRS2 6.7/7.5 (4.1) 0–17 7.1/7 (3.9) 1–15 1.7/0 (2.7) 0–13
HARS3 9.6/10.5 (5.9) 0–17 7.3/6 (6.2) 0–17 2.1/1 (3.6) 0–19
1Scale for the Rating and Assessment of Ataxia (SARA), 2Hamilton Depression Rating Scale, 3Hamilton Anxiety Rating Scale. Source: Author’s calculation.
Orientation and attention were tested with the help of several
subtests: the Orientation and attention subscale from the ACE-R;
the Digit Span-subtest from the VITI (Vekslerov Individualni Test
Inteligencije) (Pavlović, 2003), a Serbian adaptation of Wechsler’s
Adult Intelligence Scale – Revised. The subjects were asked to
repeat auditorily presented sequences of digits forward (up to 9
digits) and backward (up to 8 digits), and trials were administered
until two failures of each span length. The total number of
correct answers after the transformation into a scaled score
was then used. To assess attention and psychomotor speed, we
used the Trail Making Test Part A (TMT-A), a timed measure
of selective attention to visually presented information (Lezak,
1995). The TMT-A consists of 25 circles distributed over a sheet
of paper. The patients were asked to draw lines to connect them
in ascending order as fast as possible.
Calculation was assessed using the Arithmetics-subtest
from VITI (Pavlović, 2003), which consists of a series of
verbally presented arithmetic questions of increasing difficulty.
Transformed total scores were used.
Confrontation naming was assessed with the Boston Naming
Test (BNT) using a raw score that represents the total of correctly
named objects (spontaneously or after giving a semantic cue)
(Kaplan et al., 1983).
Visuospatial processing was tested using the Hooper Visual
Organization Test (HVOT) (Western Psychological Services,
1983). The total number of correct answers was recorded.
Executive functions were evaluated using several subtests: the
Stroop Color and Word Test (SCWT) (Lezak, 1995). This test
involves an interference task, requiring the naming of color ink,
preventing the reading of words for which the color and meaning
of the words are incongruent (for example, the word “red” written
in green). The analysis includes the time (in seconds) required to
complete the task. Verbal working memory was assessed using
the Digit Ordering Test (DOT) (Cooper et al., 1991): a series of
seven digits that has to be memorized and immediately recalled
in ascending order. The total number of correct answers and
the maximum forward range were used in the analysis. Letter
fluency (number of words beginning with the letters S, K, and
L produced in 60 s) and category fluency (number of animals
produced in 60 s) (Lezak, 1995) were used as measures of verbal
divergent thinking. The analysis included the total raw score for
all three letters, the score for category fluency, and the corrected
values for both of these measures. All tests were conducted by a
qualified neuropsychologist in a standardized manner consistent
across subjects.
Mood Assessment
Mood was evaluated with the help of two tests:
Depression Assessment
The Hamilton Depression Rating Scale (HDRS) (Hamilton, 1960),
which consists of 17 questions, was used to assess the patients’
levels of depression. The assessment, which was in the form of a
structured interview, was conducted by a trained physician. Total
scores vary from 0 to 53. For the HDRS, a score of 0–7 is generally
accepted as being within the normal range, while a score of 20 or
higher indicates at least moderate severity.
Anxiety Assessment
The Hamilton Anxiety Rating Scale (HARS) (Hamilton, 1959) was
used to determine the presence of anxiety in our patients. The
Scale is completed by a trained physician acting as the examiner,
based on interviews held with patients. The Scale consists of
14 items which are individually rated from 0 (not present) to 4
(severe). Total scores vary from 0 to 56. Patients with score ≥13
were considered anxious.
Data Analysis
The assumption of normality of dependent variables (Faux Pas
Recognition Test, RMET, neuropsychological tests, the duration
of the disease, SARA, mood assessment and EF, and other
neuropsychological functions tests) was determined based on
the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests,
which indicate the application of non-parametric techniques
(p < 0.05). The non-parametric Kruskal Wallis Test, with
post hoc pairwise comparisons, was used to compare the three
groups (SCA, ILOCA, and HC) in terms of socio-demographic
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variables, mood assessment tests, Faux Pas Recognition Test,
RMET and neuropsychological tests. The Mann-Whitney U
Test for independent samples was used to detect differences in
the scores between the two CD groups, on variables assessed
only on these groups, such as duration of the disease, clinical
characteristics/SARA. The Spearman rank-order correlation
coefficient was used to correlate the Faux Pas Recognition Test
and RMET results with the duration of the disease, clinical
characteristics/SARA, psychiatric tests and EF tests in all three
groups (SCA1+ 2, ILOCA, HC). Multiple regression analysis was
used to determine whether EFs qualify as significant predictors
on the Faux Pas Recognition Test and RMET in SCA and
ILOCA groups. Same analysis was used to determine whether all
neuropsychological tests could significantly predict scores on the
Faux Pas Recognition Test and RMET in both CD groups. The
statistical analyses were performed using IBM SPSS software 21.
RESULTS
Demographic details of CD patients and HC are displayed in
Table 1. The Kruskal Wallis Test showed a significant difference
in the mean age (χ2 = 6,961; p = 0.031) between the three groups.
The test showed no significant difference in the mean level of
education (χ2 = 1,702; p = 0.427) between the three groups.
The mood assessment test results seem to be within the normal
expected range for each of the three groups, and the Kruskal
Wallis Test showed a significant difference in the mean HDRS
score (χ2 = 29,414; p = 0.0001) and HARS score (χ2 = 20,825;
p = 0.0001). Post hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni
correction indicated differences between:
- SCA1 + 2 and ILOCA groups in age (t = −26,781;
p = 0.025),
- HC and SCA1 + 2 groups (t = −24,346; p = 0.0001) and
HC and ILOCA groups (t =−26,735; p = 0.0001) in HDRS
score
- HC and SCA1 + 2 groups (t = −17,173; p = 0.011) and
HC and ILOCA groups (t =−24,346; p = 0.0001) in HARS
score.
For variables applicable only to the CD groups (SCA1+ 2 and
ILOCA), Mann-Whitney U Tests indicated significant differences
in onset of disease (U = 42.5; z = −3.505; p = 0.0001), truncal
ataxia (U = 39.5; z = −3.632; p = 0.0001), dysarthria (U = 78;
z =−2.398; p = 0.017), limb ataxia (U = 47; z =−3.372 p = 0.001),
and SARA (U = 34.5; z =−3.783; p = 0.0001) between patients in
the SCA1+ 2 and ILOCA groups.
Mean values, standard deviations and range are shown in
Table 1.
Social Cognition Profile in CD Patients
vs. HC
We identified significant differences in the performance on the
Faux Pas Recognition Test and RMET between the CD patients
and HCs. Box plots illustrating the differences in the average
scores (in%) obtained from CD and HC subjects in each social
cognition task (Faux Pas stories, No-Faux Pas stories and RMET)
are shown in Figure 1. In the Faux Pas Recognition Test the
patients with cerebellar hereditary and non-hereditary disorders
showed impaired scores compared to HCs [U = 129.5, z =−5.544,
p = 0.0001, r = 0.67 (high effect size, 95%CI: 0.523 to 0.788)].
Moreover, the patients with cerebellar hereditary and non-
hereditary disorders obtained significantly lower scores than HCs
in the RMET [U = 17.0, z = −6.895, p = 0.0001, r = 0.84 (high
effect size, 95%CI: 0.756 to 0.899)].
Differences in the Faux Pas Recognition
Test and RMET Outcomes Among All
Studied Groups
We further investigated the differences in the performance on the
Faux Pas Recognition Test and RMET tests between groups. The
average score (standard deviation) on the Faux Pas Recognition
Test was 63.8 (11.6) for SCA1+ 2, 78.8 (13.9) for ILOCA and 91.9
(10.2) for HC. The average score (standard deviation) on RMET
was 52.8 (14.4) for SCA1 + 2, 64.4 (10.4) for ILOCA and 85.3
(8.3) for HC. Kruskal Wallis Test showed a significant difference
in the mean Faux Pas Recognition Test score (χ2 = 36,661;
p = 0.0001) and RMET score (χ2 =49,316; p = 0.0001). Post
hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction indicated
differences between:
- The scores for all three groups on the Faux Pas Recognition
Test; SCA1 + 2 and ILOCA (t = −16,417; p = 0.045),
SCA1 + 2 and HC (t = 34,108; p = 0.0001), ILOCA and
HC (t = 17,691; p = 0.009). Based on medians, the patients
in the SCA1 + 2 group obtained lower scores than the
patients in the ILOCA group, while both of these groups
obtained lower scores than the HC group participants.
- CD groups in comparison to HC group on RMET scores,
SCA1 + 2 and HC (t = 37,250; p = 0.0001), ILOCA
and HC (t = 28,219; p = 0.0001). Based on median
values, the patients in the SCA1 + 2 and ILOCA group
obtained similar scores, which were lower than HC group
participants.
Neuropsychological Findings
We investigated intergroup comparisons (SCA1 + 2, ILOCA,
and HC) in scores on the neuropsychological tests. Median and
significance for intergroup comparisons can be seen in Table 2.
The Kruskal Wallis Test showed a significant difference in
the mean MMSE score (χ2 = 11,299; p = 0.004), ACE-R – total
(χ2 = 27,801; p = 0.0001), FCSRT – total free recall (χ2 = 21,097;
p = 0.0001), FCSRT – delayed free recall (χ2 = 12,177; p = 0.002),
FCSRT – recognition (χ2 = 18,528; p = 0.0001), ACE-R –
verbal memory (χ2 = 19,121; p = 0.0001), TMT-A (χ2 = 30,569;
p = 0.0001), Digit Span (χ2 = 23,136; p = 0.0001), Arithmetic-
VITI (χ2 = 41,979; p = 0.0001), ACE-R – phonemic fluency
(χ2 = 19,495; p = 0.0001), HVOT (χ2 = 23,541; p = 0.0001),
SCWT (χ2 = 15,779; p = 0.0001), ACE-R-Language (χ2 = 11,356;
p = 0.003), ACE-R-visuospatial skills (χ2 = 8,273; p = 0.016), DOT
Total (χ2 = 20,185; p = 0.0001).
Post hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction
indicated differences between both CD groups in comparison to
the HC group on:
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FIGURE 1 | The scores of the social cognition battery. Data are presented as
the percentage of the total number of correct responses for the Faux Pas
stories (max = 60) and the No-Faux Pas stories (max = 20), and for the RMET
(max = 36). The mean scores of the accuracy percentage, where 0% is totally
wrong and 100% is totally correct, are reported for the CD and HC groups,
and significant differences of p < 0.01 are indicated by ∗∗.
- MMSE score, ACE-R – total, FCSRT – total free recall,
ACE-R – verbal memory, TMT-A, Digit Span, Arithmetic-
VITI, ACE-R – phonemic fluency, HVOT, SCWT, DOT
Total. Based on median values, the patients in SCA1 + 2
and ILOCA group obtained similar scores, and worse than
HC group participants.
On some scales, post hoc pairwise comparisons with
Bonferroni correction indicated differences only between
SCA1+ 2 and HC group:
- FCSRT – delayed free recall, ACE-R-Language, ACE-
R-visuospatial skills. Based on medians, the patients in
SCA1 + 2 group obtained worse scores than HC group
participants, while patients in the ILOCA group obtained
scores between the other two.
And lastly, on FCSRT – recognition scale, post hoc pairwise
comparisons with Bonferroni correction indicated differences
between the SCA1 + 2 and HC groups (t = 17,905; p = 0.0001),
and between the SCA1 + 2 and ILOCA groups (t = −13,424;
p = 0.019). Median values indicate that the patients in SCA1 + 2
group obtained lower scores than the other two groups, patients
in the ILOCA group and HC participants.
Associations of the Social Cognitive
Profile With Sociodemographic, Clinical,
and Genetic Features of CD Patients
With Their Neuropsychological Findings
and Mood State
The duration of the disease (r = −0.555, 95%CI: −0.119 to
−0.811, p = 0.017), truncal ataxia (r = −0.557, 95%CI: −0.122 to
−0.812, p = 0.016) and SARA score (r = −0.561, 95%CI: −0.128
to −0.814, p = 0.015) showed a significant inverse (negative)
correlation with the Faux Pas Recognition Test in the SCA1 and
SCA2 groups of patients, while the SCWT (r = −0.482, 95%CI:
−0.002 to −0.781, p = 0.050) correlated inversely with RMET.
In the ILOCA group of patients, RMET correlated with HDRS
(r = 0.498, 95%CI: 0.004 to 0.796, p = 0.050) and HARS (r = 0.541,
95%CI: 0.062 to 0.817, p = 0.030) and ACE-Phonemic Fluency
(r = 0.545, 95%CI: 0.068 to 0.819, p = 0.029). There was no
significant correlation in the SCA1 and SCA2 groups of patients
between the number of repeats in the expanded allele and the
achievement on Faux Pas Recognition Test and RMET.
Predictors of Social Cognition
Impairment in CD Patients
The final goal of this study was to determine whether EFs are
significant predictors of performance in social cognition tests
in SCA1 + 2 and ILOCA patients. The predictor variables
(SCWT, DOT Total, ACE-R-Phonemic Fluency) did not show
significant prediction of the Faux Pas Recognition Test scores
in the SCA1 + 2 group (F = 1.802; df = 3.13; p > 0.05),
nor in the ILOCA group (F = 1.269; df = 3.11; p > 0.05).
In addition, in the ILOCA group, EFs (SCWT, DOT Total,
ACE-R-Phonemic Fluency) did not show significant prediction
of RMET (F = 1.95; df = 3.11; p > 0.05). On the other
hand, in the SCA1 + 2 group, EFs appeared as significant
predictors of the Emotion Recognition Test (F = 4.05; df = 3.13;
p = 0.031), explaining 48.3% of the variance. The only significant
predictor was SCWT (β = −0.631, 95% CI from −1.04 to
−0.22, t = −3.006, p < 0.05). If the SCWT score were to
increase by one standard deviation, the achievement scores on
the RMET would likely decrease by 0.63 units of standard
deviation in the patients of the SCA1 + 2 group. Since only one
EF test could predict social cognition impairment, we wanted
to determine which other domains of neuropsychological tests
might be significant predictors of failure in social cognition in
both groups of CD patients.
First, we entered all neuropsychological tests in the regression
model, but some of them showed suppression effects that
needed to be removed from the model. The final list of
neuropsychological predictors (MMSE score, FCSRT – Delayed
free recall, TMT-A, BNT – Total, SCWT and DOT Total)
showed significant prediction of Faux Pas Recognition Test
(F = 7.458; df = 6.23; p = 0.0001) in CD patients, explaining
66% of the variance. Standardized beta coefficients show
that BNT – Total (β = 0.47, 95%CI from 0.16 to 0.77,
t = 2.97, p = 0.007) has the greatest effect, followed by TMT-
A (β = −0.37, 95%CI from −0.09 to −0.65, t = −2.64,
p = 0.014) and FCSRT – Delayed free recall (β = 0.26,
95%CI from 0.01 to 0.51, t = 2.07, p = 0.049), while
MMSE score, SCWT and DOT Total did not appear as
significant predictors.
Before predicting the Emotion Recognition Test (RMET)
findings, after removing suppressors, the final list of predictors
contained FCSRT-Total free recall, FCSRT – Delayed free
recall, ACE-R Verbal Memory, TMT-A, BNT, and ACE-R-
Language. Regression model was significant (F = 11.088;
df = 6.24; p = 0.0001) in CD patients, explaining 73.5% of
the variance. Standardized beta coefficients show that only
BNT – Total (β = 0.612, 95%CI from 0.34 to 0.88, t = 4.406,
p = 0.0001) represents a significant predictor of achievement on
RMET in CD patients.
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DISCUSSION
Our study shows that patients with CD (SCA1, SCA2, and
ILOCA) exhibit impaired performance on both the Faux Pas
Recognition Test and the RMET compared with HC. The patients
have difficulty understanding the mental states of others in
everyday interactions and from their facial expressions.
Our study examined two groups of patients: a group of SCA1
and SCA2 patients with severe cerebellar and extra-cerebellar
signs and a group of ILOCA patients with primarily isolated
cerebellar degeneration. The poor performance of both groups
possibly suggests that a cerebellar pathology alone produces social
cognition impairment, as previously shown by Hoche (Hoche
et al., 2016). SCA patients achieved the worst results on the
social cognition tests used in our study, which may suggest
that social cognition also involves extra-cerebellar structures
(Van Overwalle et al., 2015).
Cerebellar disorders are a group of subentities with origins
in various pathophysiological mechanisms; they are also
characterized by different levels of social cognitive impairment.
Some studies suggest that patients with a left lateral cerebellar
tumor (Sokolov et al., 2010) and patients with ponto-cerebellar
ischemia (Roldan Gerschcovich et al., 2011) can also exhibit
social cognition impairment. Schizophrenia and autism spectrum
disorders are further characterized by dysfunctions of cerebellar-
cortical networks and an impairment of the “mentalizing” process
(Andreasen and Pierson, 2008; Penn et al., 2008; Green et al.,
2015).
The duration of the disease was similar in all the patients
who took part in our study. The SCA group consisted of
younger patients with a more severe clinical presentation
and disability (SARA), exhibiting a more serious truncal
and limbic ataxia and dysarthria before the commencement
of the study. The deleterious effect of the disease in SCA
patients, corroborated by the neuropshychological tests, was
also evident in other domains of cognition. Unlike our ILOCA
patients, the SCA group consistently achieved poorer results
compared with the HCs in all examined domains. Routine
clinical practice may not have detected these deficits if only
MMSE tests had been used, as the SCA patients’ group
scores were within the prescribed normal values. However,
a detailed neuropsychological evaluation and screening tests
such as ACE-R can detect a more serious cognitive deficit.
The severity of ataxia in all SCA patients positively correlated
with the patients’ cognitive deficit (Ma et al., 2014), although
some sources suggest that cognitive functions are affected
TABLE 2 | Neuropsychological screening – descriptive statistics and group comparison.
SCA1+2 (n = 18) ILOCA (n = 16) HC (n = 34) SCA1+2 - HC ILOCA - HC
Mean/Median (sd) Range Mean/Median (sd) Range Mean/Median (sd) Range t t
Global cognitive functioning
MMSE1 27.2/27.5 (2.8) 19–30 27.8/27.5 (1.7) 25–30 29.1/30 (1.2) 27–30 16.428* 15.22*
ACE-R-total2 82.6/85.5 (12.0) 56–99 89.9/89 (4.9) 80–98 95.9/97(4.2) 86–100 29.601** 19.41**
Learning and episodic verbal memory3
FCSRT-total free recall 20.6/20.5 (6.8) 5–33 22.1/22.5 (4.9) 15–32 29.2/34 (6.9) 8–40 23.662** 19.756**
FCSRT-delayed free recall 8.4/8.5 (2.7) 5–13 10.4/10 (2.5) 5–15 11.3/12 (2.6) 4–15 19.941**
FCSRT-recognition 14.4/14.5 (1.7) 12–16 15.5/16 (1.5) 10–16 15.9/16 (0.2) 15–16 17.905**
ACE-R-verbal memory 21.7/23 (4.9) 6–26 23.3/23 (2.2) 19–26 25.3/26 (1.4) 21–26 22.26** 17.774**
Orientation and attention
ACE-R-orientation and attention 16.6/17 (1.8) 12–18 17.3/17.5 (0.9) 16–18 17.6/18 (0.7) 16–18
TMT-A 83.6/74 (36.6) 30–157 49.3/42.5 (17.0) 22–82 33.4/30 (14.7) 18–78 31.183** 17.169*
Digit-span 7.7/8 (2.1) 4–11 8.3/8 (2.9) 4–13 11.3/11.5 (2.1) 7–15 24.977** 20.088**
Calculation
Arithmetic-VITI4 9.1/9 (3.2) 3–14 11.3/11 (1.6) 9–14 13.8/14 (0.5) 12–14 32.647** 24.014**
Language
ACE-R-language 23.2/25 (3.2) 15–26 24.8/25 (0.8) 24–26 25.4/26 (1.2) 22–26 17.188**
BNT-Total 50.3/52 (6.4) 40–58 53.3/54 (3.1) 45–57 54.4/55 (3.9) 40–59
Visuospatial processing
HVOT5 17.2/17 (6.3) 8–25 21.3/21.5 (3.1) 16–25 24.6/25 (2.9) 17–29 26.103** 18.39**
ACE-R-visuospatial skills 13.2/14 (3.1) 8–16 15.3/16 (1.0) 13–16 15.3/16 (1.4) 11–16 14.634**
Executive functions
SCWT6 91.6/90 (37.6) 45–154 97.3/98 (41.2) 36–180 57.9/53.5 (21.5) 10–98 18.088** 19.488**
DOT Total7 5.3/5 (1.9) 2–9 6.0/6 (1.3) 4–9 7.9/8 (2.1) 4–12 23.5** 18.188**
ACE-R-phonemic fluency 3.8/4 (1.6) 1–7 4.4/4 (1.5) 2–7 5.7/6 (0.9) 4–7 23.034** 17.086*
1Mini Mental State Examination, 2Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination – Revised, 3Free and Cued Selective Reminding Test, 4Serbian adaptation of the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale – Revised, 5Hooper Visual Organization Test, 6Stroop Color and Word Test, 7Digit Ordering Test. Source: Author’s calculation (** indicate p < 0.01,
while * indicates p < 0.05).
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first and have a slower progression than motor dysfunctions
(Fancellu et al., 2013).
Compared to healthy subjects, our SCA patients exhibited
consistently poorer results on tests measuring attention and
verbal memory than ILOCA patients, which other authors
have also previously recorded (Bürk et al., 2001; Le Pira
et al., 2002; Fancellu et al., 2013). The ILOCA patients
exhibited worse results than the HC in most cognitive domains,
but verbal memory, speech and visuospatial deficits were
less frequent. Finally, the executive functioning of both the
ILOCA and the SCA patients was equally impaired, which
previous studies have also found (Bürk et al., 1999, 2001;
Rentiya et al., 2018), while the differences in visuospatial tasks
proved less consistent (Wallesch and Horn, 1990; Schmahmann
and Sherman, 1998; Rentiya et al., 2018). The extent of
cognitive impairment, especially that of attention and executive
functioning, verbal and semantic memory, language and speech
competence, may explain the patients’ poor performance on
social cognition tests (Haxby et al., 2000; Siegal and Varley,
2002).
The duration of the disease, functional disability and truncal
ataxia significantly correlated with the SCA patients’ performance
on the Faux Pas Recognition Test. SCWT and Phonemic Fluency
Test, and significantly correlated with the RMET in the SCA and
ILOCA group, respectively, but no correlation was determined
with verbally presented social situations in the Faux Pas stories.
Although prior studies have shown that social cognition
impairments are often associated with executive dysfunction
(Aboulafia-Brakha et al., 2011), the literature offers conflicting
data (Fine et al., 2001; Clausi et al., 2021). Analysis of
connectivity suggests that the cerebellar modules active during
social cognition are more likely to be involved in socio-cognitive
and not executive networks (Van Overwalle et al., 2015).
Depression and depressive symptoms were the most
common non-cognitive symptoms in several studies of
patients with cerebellar disorders (Leroi et al., 2002;
Liszewski et al., 2004). Although the mean scores in both
our groups of patients were within the range for the healthy
population, significant difference was observed between
the CD patients and the HC. Further, several patients in
the SCA1 and 2 groups had a score above 14. The ILOCA
group’s anxiety and depression scores correlated with the
patients’ performance on the RMET. A larger sample
of CD patients is necessary to determine the impact of
depression on social cognition. It is possible that the patient’s
impaired perception hampers the understanding of other
people’s mental states.
The predictive value of EFs in the assessment of social
cognition was ambiguous. The EF tests we used did not
significantly predict the Faux Pas test performance in our
SCA patients. SCWT showed significant predictive value
for the RMET performance in the SCA group, but not
in the ILOCA patients. The most significant predictor in
all groups and for both tests was the BNT language and
speech test. Language and speech, skills inherent to humans,
are primarily an instrument for interpersonal communication
(Schmahmann, 2019) and involve the comprehension of
words, sentences and stories arising from and serving social
interaction. It is thus natural that speech proved to be the
best predictor of social cognition among our CD patients
(Mariën and Beaton, 2014; Mariën et al., 2014). The social
cognition impairment in our CD patients involved diminished
semantic lexicon. Errors of this segment inevitably cause
difficulties in conducting original cognitive functions and normal
social functioning.
Our patients with primary cerebellar disease exhibited
impairments in the Faux Pas Recognition Test and the RMET,
which are traditionally considered indicators of social cognition.
As mentioned above, the deficit was primarily caused by
semantic processing impairment, but the extent of damage
in other cognitive domains determined the severity of social
deficit. The literature describes the role of the cerebellum
in the cognitive deficit of SCA1 and 2 pathologies, which
is commonly attributed to extra-cerebellar degeneration and
damaged ties primarily between the basal ganglia and the
thalamocortical circles (Gilman et al., 1996; Kawai et al.,
2009). Other studies agree with our results, which associate
social cognition with specific regions of the brain: mesial
and orbitofrontal cortex (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Frith
and Frith, 2006; Völlm et al., 2006) and mesial temporal
cortex (Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Völlm et al., 2006).
Furthermore, (Charlton et al., 2009) it has been shown that
poor performance on social cognition tests can be associated
with changes in the white matter. We support the assertion
that mentalizing processes depend on a complex network
which connect different regions and involves ties in the
brain’s white matter.
It is unclear whether the obtained data give insight into the
patients’ overall social abilities or only into routine components
necessary for opinion forming. The metric characteristics of
the tests, ecological as well as criterion validity, are of special
importance in assessing social cognition. Cognition in real
social settings is a dynamic, changeable, and context-dependent
process. We concur with (Byom and Mutlu, 2013) that the
assessment of social cognition in experimental settings may
lead to the under- or overestimation of this complex function,
resulting in inconsistent results.
In summary, the findings from this study is that social
cognition impairment is present in both the SCA 1 + 2
and the ILOCA patients and that the predictors of this
impairment are Efs and language. The conclusions of this
study are limited due to the small sample of patients
and the fact that they were in the advanced stage of the
disease, with great physical and cognitive deterioration. The
SCA group was in itself heterogeneous and included two
somewhat different entities, where the SCA2 group consisted
of patients with severe cognitive impairments, even dementia
(Bürk et al., 1999). Because of this, the implication that
some brain regions contribute to social cognition must be
considered with caution. Future studies must avoid the current
study’s limitations.
The body of evidence suggesting the existence of cognitive and
mentalizing deficits in CD is growing. We hope our study will
encourage theories which embrace the possibility of a completely
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different profile of the deficit within this heterogeneous disorder.
Socialization is the core of all human relationships, which is why
the implications of impaired social cognition need to be taken
seriously when considering treatment options.
Future research should branch into two directions:
researching the cognitive changes in CD and determining
the profile of some entities of this heterogeneous disorder.
Special attention should be dedicated to operationalizing the
mentalizing process, determining the main neuropsychological
processes and neural correlates involved, and defining adequate
assessment instruments.
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